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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Traditionally, nation-states have played a central, if not exclusive, role in the
human rights system. 1 Critical to the functioning of the human rights system has been the
act of binding states through a network of treaty obligations to which only states could
become parties. 2 This traditional model of human rights obligations has in recent years
come under increased pressure from a changing, globalizing world. Greater attention is
now being paid to the role and responsibilities of non-state actors, such as individuals and
corporations, vis-à-vis human rights. 3
A new, modernized human rights system is developing in which the non-state actor
has abandoned its marginal role and is growing in prominence. Moreover, one of the
newer concepts in this modernized system is the notion of corporate human rights
responsibility for both state and non-state actors. In recent years, state actors have been
found to have violated articles of human rights conventions for failing to stop the
activities of non-state corporate actors. For example, in the case of López Ostra v. Spain,
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) found that Spain had violated Article 8
of the European Convention of Human Rights because the state failed to stop the
activities of a waste-treatment plant whose operations caused nuisance and health
problems for nearby inhabitants. 4 In its decision, the court formally recognized that
environmental degradation can obstruct one’s enjoyment of human rights. 5 The decision
demonstrated the court’s willingness to address corporate human rights violations, even if
it must do so through a state actor.
Another feature of this new, modernized human rights system has to do with the
recognition that the reach of human rights continues to expand to encompass social and
environmental rights, making a discussion of such rights particularly relevant in the area
of corporate human rights responsibility. The decision in López Ostra v. Spain6
∗

J.D. Candidate 2009, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. cum laude in History, Yale College,
2003. Sincere thanks to the current Board members of the Journal of International Human Rights here at
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1
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW , POLITICS, M ORALS 1385 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2008)(1996)[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT ].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
López Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16-17 (1994).
5
Judith Hippler Bello & Richard Desgagne, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 89 A M. J. INT ’L L. 788, 789 (1995).
6
López Ostra, supra note 4.
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exemplifies the expanded reach of human rights through the recognition that social and
environmental conditions such as noise and pollution are within the ambit of a person’s
rights protected by Article 8 of the European Convention. 7 The López Ostra opinion
clearly recognized the connection between environmental conditions and human rights in
stating that “severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and
prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and
family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.”8 The court’s
later decisions confirmed the position that the court considers the creation of certain
social and environmental conditions as possible human rights violations. 9
Within the non-state actor world, the winds of change have led private entities such
as corporations and financial institutions to begin expressing a sense of responsibility for
sustainable development and responsible lending practices. To this end, private actors
have chosen to engage mainly in voluntary, non-enforceable commitments such as
guidelines and principles. 10 Such non-enforceable commitments and guidelines have the
advantage of sending a strong, public message to the world of a corporation’s policy
concerning responsible development, while stopping short of providing enforceable legal
liability. Concurrently, individuals and NGOs have led attempts to hold such private
entities accountable for violations of environmental laws and human rights based on their
voluntary commitments. 11
Voluntary commitments allow individuals and NGOs to try to affect change in two
main ways. First, individuals and NGOs can publicly pressure private actors to comply
with their own voluntarily, publicly-expressed commitments to human rights, sustainable
development or environmental responsibility. Second, if the voluntary commitments
themselves provide such recourse, individuals and NGOs can file a complaint with a
formal adjudicatory venue. Pressuring private entities to enforce the voluntary
commitments allows individuals and NGOs to circumvent the sometimes difficult issues
of standing and justic iability which typically restrict the range of actors and subject
matters that can be adjudicated in both domestic and international courts. Moreover,
7

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1980, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
Article 8
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
8

López Ostra, supra note 4.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, 36022/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 107 (2001) (holding that the United Kingdom
violated Article 8 in failing to strike a fair balance between the state’s regulation of Heathrow Airport
aircraft noise levels and the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and
their private and family lives); see also Hatton v. United Kingdom, 36022/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 96 (2003)
(reversing the 2001 decision, but nonetheless recognizing that “where an individual is directly and seriously
affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8.”); see also Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 57 (1998) (observing that “[t]he direct effect of the toxic emissions on the applicants’ right
to respect for their private and family life means that Article 8 is applicable.”).
10
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT , supra note 1, at 1396-98, 1402-03.
11
Michael K. Lee, The Uruguay Paper Pulp Mill Dispute: Highlighting the Growing Importance of NGOs
and Public Protest in the Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 71, 71 (2006).
9
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avoiding the court system allows individuals and NGOs to effectuate change while
avoiding the often lengthy and time-consuming court procedures. As opportunities for
enforcing voluntary commitments grow, individuals’ and NGOs’ efforts to hold private
entities accountable will play an increasingly important role in enforcing human rights
law. 12
The story of an Argentine NGO that failed to stop the financing of a paper pulp
mill in Uruguay identifies the avenues open to individuals and NGOs to hold Equator
Principles signatories accountable. The Equator Principles are a set of voluntary
commitments that ten private financial institutions adopted on June 4, 2003. 13 The
Principles reflect a commitment to, and increasing preoccupation with, responsible
lending practices, with particular regard to social and environmental issues. 14 The ten
pioneering financial institutions have called themselves the Equator Principles Financial
Institutions (“EPFI”). 15 After only three years, the original ten EPFIs were joined by
another thirty who, together, are responsible for over 80% of the world’s project
finance. 16
This note will focus on the Center for Human Rights and Environment’s
(“CEDHA”) 17 efforts to use the Equator Principles to stop the financing and construction
of the Orion paper-pulp mill by the Finnish company Metsa-Botnia 18 in neighboring
Uruguay. The Equator Princ iples were only one basis for a larger campaign to impute
corporate human rights responsibility and to stop the construction of the pulp mill.
CEDHA alleged violations of international human rights and international environmental
law, violations of international bilateral law, violations of the International Finance
Corporation Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies (“IFC Safeguards”), 19

12

Id. at 73.
The “Equator Principles”: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing
Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 2006), available at http://www.equatorprinciples.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf [hereinafter The Equator Principles].
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Paul Q. Watchman, Banking on Responsibility, A.L.I. 385, 398 (2006).
17
The Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, CEDHA, is an Argentinean non-profit organization that
aims to build a more harmonious relationship between the environment and people. Its work centers on
promoting greater access to justice and guaranteeing human rights for victims of environmental
degradation, non-sustainable management of natural resources. See CEDHA, General Information about
CEDHA, http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/general_information/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
18
The forest industry company Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab - marketing name Botnia - was founded in 1973. It
manufactures high quality bleached pulp grades under the name Botnia. Botnia is owned by M-real Oyj,
Metsäliitto Osuuskunta, and UPM-Kymmene Oyj. See Metsa-Botnia, Our Company,
http://www.botnia.com/en/default.asp?path=204,208 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
19
The International Finance Corporation is a member of the World Bank Group. It provides loans, equity,
structured finance and risk management products, and advisory services to build the private sector in
developing countries. See International Finance Corporation, About IFC, http://www.ifc.org/about (last
visited Apr. 16, 2008). The IFC Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies contain three prongs: first, a
Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability which defines the IFC’s role and responsibility in
supporting project performance in partnership with client; second, a Disclosure Policy which defines the
IFC’s obligations to disclose information about itself as an institution and its activities; third, an
Environmental and Social Review Procedure which gives direction to IFC officers in implementing the
Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability and reviewing compliance and implementation by
private sector projects. See International Finance Corporation, Environmental and Social Standards,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/EnvSocStandards (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
13
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violations of IFC Disclosure Policy, violations of national and regional laws in Uruguay
and Argentina, and finally, violations of the Equator Principles. 20
¶8
Although the Orion project’s financing institution was an EPFI, CEDHA found
nothing in the text of the Equator Principles to hold the EPFI liable for a violation of the
Principles. 21 The Principles do not establish a mechanism for self-enforcement, as they
were conceived as a set of voluntary guidelines. 22 Instead, their adoption is seen as a
commitment to the development of internal policies and practices. 23 As discussed infra,
Principle 6 establishes a Grievance Mechanism through which an NGO can reach the
borrower, but not the EPFI. 24 The Disclaimer section of the Principles also makes clear
that the Principles do not create any rights or liabilities. 25
¶9
Nevertheless, the voluntary principles did play an important role in CEDHA’s
campaign. First, it allowed the NGO to shame and expose the EPFIs to public scrutiny.
Crucial to this campaign were charges of non-compliance with the Equator Principles
sent directly to the EPFIs. CEDHA’s public shaming campaign was instrumental in
forcing the withdrawal of the first EPFI, ING Group, from the project. The campaign,
however, did not persuade the second EPFI, Calyon, to withdraw. Second, since the
Principles tie the EPFIs to compliance with IFC Safeguards, the voluntary commitment
gave CEDHA the opportunity to challenge the project’s compliance with IFC Safeguards
through a formal complaint with the Compliance Advisory Ombudsman (“CAO”), the
independent recourse mechanism for the IFC. In response to the CEDHA complaint, the
CAO reviewed the compliance of the Orion project with IFC Safeguards and issued a
report which focused on and found several procedural deficiencies, which the IFC
remedied easily. 26 Once the IFC concluded that the project conformed to its own
environmental and social policies, Calyon, the second EPFI involved in the project, was
assured that the project did not violate the provisions of the Equator Principles. 27 The end
result of this formal complaint was mere procedural compliance with the disclosure
schedules established by the IFC Safeguards. This outcome shows that while the
Principles offer NGOs access to a formal adjudicatory venue, the findings of this venue
may not help the NGO achieve its final goal of stopping the construction of the paper
pulp mill.
¶10
The story of the Orion project makes clear that individuals and NGOs cannot rely
entirely on the Equator Principles to impose liability on EPFIs. The voluntary nature of
the Principles itself effectively means that the reach of the Principles depends on a given
EPFI’s conscience, unless those trying to force compliance are able to mount a public
shaming campaign of such magnitude as to force the EPFI to comply. Moreover, if the
20

Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, Compliance Complaint Regarding Proposed Pulp Paper Mill Investment
in Fray Bentos Uruguay (May 18, 2006), available at
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/compliance-complaint-calyon.pdf.
21
Id.; see also The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 5.
22
See The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 5.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 4.
25
Id. at 5.
26
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, PRELIMINARY A SSESSMENT REPORT : COMPLAINT REGARDING
IFC’ S PROPOSED INVESTMENT IN CELULOSAS DE M’BOPICUÁ AND ORION PROJECTS, URUGUAY (2005),
available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html -english/documents/preliminary_assessmentFINAL.pdf
[hereinafter CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT ].
27
Id.
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EPFI claims and the IFC finds that the project does comply with IFC Safeguards,
procedural compliance alone may still be insufficient to ensure that private financial
institutions are financing projects less likely to cause social and environmental harm.
Where, as here, procedural compliance was insufficient, the Principles nevertheless
remain a stepping-stone to a future mechanism of more substantial, if not binding,
commitments by financial non-state actors to responsible investing.
¶11
Despite their shortcomings, voluntary commitments create a forum in which
interested non-state actors -- individuals, NGOs and corporations -- may participate
actively in the development of corporate human rights responsibilities. CEDHA’s
campaign was a strong testament to the crucial role NGOs play and will continue to play
in the area of corporate human rights responsibility, especially in ensuring that non-state
actors abide by their voluntary commitments and guidelines. Created as a result of
voluntary commitments, the Equator Principles also invite corporations to develop and
improve their own position on sustainable development. It is in this sense that the
development and continued existence of voluntary commitments are not only crucial for
the potential of NGO public shaming campaigns and access to formal adjudicatory
venues, but are also an invaluable contribution to the corporate responsibility movement.
II. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES
¶12

Ten private financial institutions adopted the Equator Principles on June 4, 2003,
committing themselves to sustainable development and responsible investment. 28 For
projects whose costs exceed $50 million, and are thus more likely to affect social and
environmental conditions, the financial institutions have agreed to invest only in those
projects that comply with IFC Safeguards. 29 The Preamble notes that the purpose of the
Principles is “to ensure that the projects we finance are developed in a manner that is
socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices.”30 Sixty
signatories are currently committed to the Principles. 31 Also, it is noteworthy that the
project finance threshold has recently been lowered from $50 million to $10 million. 32
This threshold shift means that the Principles can reach a greater number of projects that
can potentially cause social and environmental damage. 33
¶13
The Equator Principles’ Preamble establishes that the nine principles are intended
to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation by the EPFI of its
own internal social and environmental policies. 34 The EPFI pledges not to “provide loans
to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with our respective social
and environmental policies and procedures that implement the Equator Principles.”35 The
Preamble recognizes the pivotal role that project finance plays in financing deve lopment
28

The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.
Id.
30
Id. at 1.
31
The Equator Principles, The Equator Principles, available at http://www.equator-principles.com (last
visited Apr. 16, 2008).
32
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2. The lower threshold “ensure[s] that all significant and
sensitive projects [are] covered by the Equator Principles.” The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked
Questions, FAQ n. 7, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/faq.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
33
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.
34
Id. at 1.
35
Id.
29
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throughout the world and the potential that project financiers will encounter complex
social and environmental issues, especially in projects in emerging markets. 36
¶14
Despite their stated goals, there is disagreement as to the real impact of the Equator
Principles. The critics emphasize the shortcomings that remain in the substance of the
Principles. 37 They point to the fact that the Principles are pegged to the IFC Standards,
but not to the broader sustainability policies underlying these standards. 38 Many argue
that the Principles should be pegged to a set of standards that reflects a more effective or
more far-reaching sustainability policy. Proponents of the current Principles, however,
stand firmly behind the proposition that independent of the motivation driving the
decision to join, the Equator Principles have committed prominent private sector entities
to an active role in the area of responsible and sustainable development and have
arguably strengthened the public’s ability to hold the financial sector accountable for its
actions. 39 More importantly, there are claims that the Equator Principles have created a
“virtuous circle” where mature sponsors are designing more robust projects to comply
with the Principles. EPFIs have also required non-Equator banks to comply with the
Principles in the administration of the project financing as a pre-condition for a facility
arranged by the EPFI. 40 A survey of the Equator Principles, conducted by a partner at the
law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (“Freshfields”), suggests that the Principles
have contributed to the creation of a common framework and language for the project
finance industry based on an external and respected benchmark, the IFC Safeguards. 41
The common framework and language are hailed as a step forward in providing the
momentum to propel “other areas of environmental and social responsibility in the
financial industry.”42
III. THE ORION PROJECT CONTROVERSY
¶15

In 2005, the Uruguayan government enthusiastically welcomed the Orion paper
pulp mill project as part of the largest capital investment in Uruguay’s history. 43 Not only
was the size of the investment unprecedented, it also followed a deep economic recession
that ensued from the collapse of Argentina’s economy in 2001. 44 The investment sought
the construction of two paper pulp mills -- the Orion pulp mill and a second mill to be
built by Spain’s ENCE -- whose total investment was valued at ten percent of the

36

Id.
Bracken: Few Signs of Equator Principles’ Success – The Equator Principles Have Been Improved But
Successful Implementation Remains the True Litmus Test, Say Andrea Durbin and Johan Frijns, THE
BANKER, Aug. 1, 2006.
38
Id. Examples of more effective or more far-reaching sustainability policies include requirements of the
IFC that fall outside the IFC performance standards such as the requirement on revenue and contract
transparency for extractive industries, as well as international standards and best practice in areas such as
human rights and climate change.
39
Andrew Hardenbrook, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s Attempt at Environmental
Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 197, 197 (2007).
40
Watchman, supra note 16, at 389.
41
Id.; see also Watchman, supra note 16.
42
The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions, FAQ n. 3, supra note 32.
43
Monte Reel, An Economic Boon in Uruguay Becomes a Bane to Argentina: Planned Paper Mills Bring
Promise of Jobs, but Also Fears of Pollution, W ASH. POST , Nov. 13, 2005, at A22.
44
Id.
37
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country’s gross domestic product. 45 The investment was expected to have a significant
impact on Uruguay by increasing its GDP by $350 million (two percent) per year. 46 The
plant would provide direct employment for 300 people and indirect employment for
another 2,200 people. 47
¶16
Neighboring Argentina, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic about a project that
would potentially pollute the River Uruguay that both countries share and that would
bring no financial benefits to Argentina. 48 As Argentina mounted its objections, some
commentators in the media viewed the issue as a political objection reflecting another
regional row between Argentina and Uruguay. 49 Others saw it as organized resistance to
the wave of European corporations shifting their operations to poorer nations after
tougher European environmental controls over pulp production took hold. 50 Jorge Pedro
Busti, Governor of Entre Ríos, the city in Uruguay which expected to be most affected by
the pulp mill, expressed the view that European corporations were taking advantage of
laxer regulations and politicians who are more easily intimidated. 51 He said, “[t]hese
companies that nobody wants in Europe just want to come to the Third World and use us
as their guinea pig.”52 Jorge Daniel Taillant of CEDHA echoed the sentiment: “This is
something that’s been going on for several decades now – the idea of transferring paper
mill industries to the global south. They are moving these companies south to places like
Uruguay where they have less strict environmental laws.”53
¶17
While Argentina took on its own fight in the international human rights arena as a
state actor, CEDHA tried to stop the financing and construction of the Orion paper pulp
mill in neighboring Uruguay through the Equator Principles. 54 Specifically, CEDHA
sought to hold two EPFIs, ING Group and Calyon, accountable for violations of the
Equator Principles. 55 The NGO sent compliance complaints directly to the EPFIs to test
the reach of the Principles. 56 The complaints denounced the EPFIs for having violated
the Principles by agreeing to finance a project that did not comply with the Principles’
guidelines. 57 Among other things, the complaint focused on the project’s deficient
Environmental Assessment and a lack of measurements of cumulative impacts the project
would have on the environment surrounding the site of the mill. 58 According to the
complaint, the site chosen for the construction of the mill was extremely rich in natural
45

Id.
US Votes in Favor of International Loan for Uruguay Pulpmill Project, US FED. NEWS, Nov. 21, 2006.
47
Id.
48
Ian Black, Unity Proves Paper Thin, GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/mar/17/businesscomment.worlddispatch.
49
Id.
50
Emad Mekay, ARGENTINA/URUGUAY: Paper Plant Row Extends to French Bank ,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33324.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, Compliance Complaint Regarding Proposed Pulp Paper Mill
Investment in Fray Bentos Uruguay (Apr. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/complaint-letter-to-ing-eng.pdf.
55
Id; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 20.
56
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note
20.
57
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.
58
Id.
46
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resources and heavily reliant on tourism and fisheries for local livelihood. 59 Not only
would the pulp mill harm such industries, but it would also present “a serious risk to the
health of local communities.”60 Further, the complaint stated that the site was
“immediately above the potable water intake for the local community of Fray Bentos”
and in “very close proximity to important tourist locations.”61
¶18
CEDHA’s, and to a certain extent Argentina’s, main objection to the construction
and operation of the pulp mills was based on environmental damage to the River Uruguay
and the surrounding areas. 62 Both CEDHA and the Argentine government faced the main
challenge of determining ways to use enforceability mechanisms to address these
environmental concerns. Since voluntary principles like the Equator Principles do not
create an enforcement mechanism, CEDHA relied mainly on a public shaming campaign
-- conducted through compliance letters sent directly to the EPFIs -- and on recourse to a
formal adjudicatory venue through the World Bank’s IFC’s dispute resolution
mechanism, the CAO.63 However, the CAO proceeding, while more formal than the
compliance complaints sent to the EPFIs, resulted in mere procedural compliance. 64
Despite their efforts to enforce the Equator Principles, CEDHA was unable to stop the
construction of the mill. 65 Mesa-Botnia completed the construction and installation of
Orion on schedule and the mill has been in operation since September 11, 2007. 66
IV. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ’ GRIEVANCE M ECHANISM
¶19

The Equator Principles provide a grievance mechanism for individuals or groups
from project-affected communities to hold borrowers accountable. However, the Equator
Principles do not contain a provision that directly connects the financial institution to
those who were or will be directly harmed by the environmental implications of a project.
Principle 6 establishes a Grievance Mechanism67 that gives people from among project59

Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 20.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Mekay, supra note 50. In particular, there was concern about toxic runoffs and the chemical stench of
rotten eggs which could affect both the agricultural and tourist industries in the region. There was also
concern that potentially carcinogenic chemicals in the runoff would be a public health hazard for those
living along the riverbanks. See Reel, supra note 48.
63
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, FINAL REPORT : CAO A UDIT OF IFC’ S AND MIGA’S DUE
DILIGENCE FOR TWO PULP M ILLS IN URUGUAY (2006), available at
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/cao-final-audit-report-eng.pdf [hereinafter CAO,
FINAL REPORT ].
64
CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26.
65
Press Release, Metsa-Botnia, The start-up process of Botnia in Fray Bentos begins today (Nov. 12,
2007), http://www.botnia.com/en/default.asp?path=204;210;211;1606;1927.
66
Id.
67
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 4.
60

Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism. For all Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects located in nonOECD countries, and those located in OECD countries not designated as High-Income, as defined by the World Bank
Development Indicators Database, to ensure that consultation, disclosure and community engagement continues
throughout construction and operation of the project, the borrower will, scaled to the risks and adverse impacts of the
project, establish a grievance mechanism as part of the management system. This will allow the borrower to receive
and facilitate resolution of concerns and grievances about the project’s social and environmental performance raised by
individuals or groups from among project-affected communities. The borrower will inform the affected communities
about the mechanism in the course of its community engagement process and ensure that the mechanism addresses
concerns promptly and transparently, in a culturally appropriate manner, and is readily accessible to all segments of the
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affected communities and NGOs access only to the borrower (in this case, Finnish MetsaBotnia), for “concerns and grievances about the project’s social and environmental
performance.”68 Even in the event that an individual or group reached out to the
borrower, the borrower is not bound by the Equator Principles. In short, the text of the
Equator Principles does not create a mechanism for enforcement of the Principles either
in the form of self-enforcement by the EPFIs themselves or by a supervisory body. The
Principles are, after all, a set of voluntary guidelines and as the Disclaimer section of the
Principles makes clear, the adoption of the Principles benefits the development of
individual, internal social and environmental policie s and practices of the EFPI. 69 The
Principles “do not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private.
Institutions are adopting and implementing these Principles voluntarily and
independently, without reliance on or recourse to the IFC or the World Bank.”70
However, as the case of the Orion pulp mill will demonstrate, exposure of an EPFI to
public scrutiny and shaming can nevertheless be a powerful and effective tool in holding
corporations to their voluntary commitments.
V. THE COMPLIANCE COMPLAINT TO THE ORION PULP MILL EPFIS
¶20

The absence of rights or liabilities does not preclude the ability of individuals and
groups to hold the signatory financial institutions publicly accountable for their voluntary
commitments to responsible lending. An NGO can use the leverage of public ridicule to
shame a financial institution into complying with its own voluntarily adopted
commitments.
¶21
CEDHA sent compliance letters to the ING Group and Calyon in 2006 in an effort
to hold the EPFIs involved in the financing of Orion accountable to their voluntarily
adopted commitments. 71 Both were early signatories to the Principles and both took pride
in their commitment to responsible financing. 72 Dutch ING committed to the Principles
on June 23, 2003 and was the eleventh financial institution to do so. 73 Moreover, since
2003, ING has become known as a leading advocate of the Equator Principles. 74 Calyon,
the finance arm of Crédit Agricole, also has publicly taken pride in its voluntary
commitment. Calyon claims to be one of the more socially responsible French banks and
boasts that it was one of the first banks to adhere to the Equator Principles. 75
Nevertheless, these compliance complaint letters achieved mixed results: ING, the first
EPFI committed to financing the Orion pulp mill withdrew from the project only to have
affected communities.
68

Id.
Id. at 2.
70
Id. at 5.
71
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note
20.
72
The Equator Principles, supra note 31.
73
Id.
74
Bretton Woods Project, Bank Stumped on Uruguayan Paper Mills, June 19, 2006,
http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=538502.
75
Press Release, CEDHA, CEDHA Press Release May 18th (May 18, 2006),
http://www.sophieprize.org/Articles/148.html; see also Press Release, Calyon, Calyon, the leading Equator
Principles bank in the second half of 2006 (Feb. 2007), at http://www.calyon.com/news/corporateinvestment-bank/league-tables-200720.
69
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its spot taken by Calyon, another EPFI, which ultimately financed the construction of the
project. 76
A. The Compliance Complaint to the ING Group
¶22

In February 2006, CEDHA addressed a complaint of non-compliance with the
Equator Principles to the ING, which had been retained in an advisory and coordinating
role by Metsa-Botnia for the financing of Orion. 77 CEDHA was acting on behalf of
40,000 stakeholders, including the Environmental Citizen’s Assembly of Gualeguaychu,
civil society organizations in both Argentina and Uruguay, and the Argentine province of
Entre Ríos. 78 The complaint identified compliance violations of the IFC Environmental
and Social Policy as well as violations of the Equator Principles themselves. 79
¶23
In its complaint, CEDHA identified violations of Principles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 80
Pertaining to Principle 1, CEDHA claimed deficient “environmental and social
screening” and supported its assertion with the CAO Preliminary Assessment Report
which was released as a result of CEDHA’s complaint filed with the CAO in September
2005.81 Further, CEDHA claimed a violation of Principle 2 based on an inadequate
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) where the borrower had not sufficiently
addressed cumulative environmental impacts and impacts on local livelihoods of affected
stakeholders. 82 Concerning Principle 3, which determines the applicable social and
environmental standards and the items the EIA should address, 83 CEDHA identified
numerous deficienc ies of the EIA report, such as inadequate consideration of the hazards,
pollutants, carcinogens and toxins associated with the operation of the pulp mill. 84 With
respect to Principle 4, which establishes that the borrower will prepare an Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) drawing on the conclusions of the EIA report, 85 CEDHA

76

Press Release, CEDHA, ING Group of Netherlands Pulls Out of Controversial Papermill while World
Bank Postpones Loans Following Critical Review of Environmental Impact Studies (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more_information/ing-postpones-loans.php; see also Press Release, CEDHA,
Papermills: Crédit Agricole of France Steps in for Botnia (May 10, 2006),
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more_information/credit-agricole-botnia.php.
77
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54. Principle 1 determines that an EPFI will categorize a
project based on the magnitude of its potential impacts and risks in accordance with the environmental and
social screening criteria of the IFC. See The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.
82
See Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54. Principle 2 establishes that for projects assessed
within Category A or Category B, the borrower must have conducted a Social and Environmental
Assessment process to address the relevant impacts and risks of the project. See The Equator Principles,
supra note 13, at 2. The Equator Principles use a system of social and environmental categorization, based
on IFC’s environmental and social screening criteria, to reflect the magnitude of impacts understood as a
result of assessment. Category A refers to projects with potential significant adverse social or
environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented. Category B refers to projects with
potential limited adverse social or environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific,
largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures. Category C refers to projects with
minimal or no social or environmental impacts. See The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 6.
83
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.
84
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.
85
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 3.
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argued that the borrower failed to prepare an EMP. 86 Finally, CEDHA claimed a
violation of Principle 5 based on the absolute lack of consultation between the borrowers
and the community, particularly Argentine stakeholders. 87
¶24
Following CEDHA’s complaint, ING stunned the project finance world when it
announced that it would withdraw from the $480 million project. 88 ING’s withdrawal
was particularly stunning because Equator Principles viola tions do not create enforceable
obligations. Although submitted following the CEDHA complaint, the withdrawal letter
stated that the decision “was not based on the assessment of the project’s compliance
with Equator Principles.”89 ING declined to explain the rationale for the decision on
grounds of client confidentiality. 90 According to Paul de Clerk of the Netherlands branch
of Friends of the Earth, 91 banks never mention an environmental- related reason for
stepping out of a project, 92 though he believed that the Equator Principles were an
important reason for ING’s withdrawal from the project. 93
¶25
On April 18, 2006, CEDHA responded with a letter expressing its enthusiasm for
ING’s decision. 94 It also stated that it understood why ING might have stated that the
Equator Principles played no role in ING’s decision to withdraw, but that it nevertheless
“appreciated the energy and effort ING Group has contributed to helping evolve the
Equator Principles.”95 Despite ING Group’s pronouncements otherwise, the media was
quick to link ING’s withdrawal to “negative publicity”96 and frequently mentioned ING
as a leading advocate for the Equator Principles. 97
B. The Compliance Complaint to Calyon
¶26

Once ING Group withdrew from the Orion Project, Calyon, the private arm of the
French bank Crédit Agricole, stepped in. 98 On May 18, 2006, CEDHA sent a complaint
letter to Calyon modeled after the letter it had sent to ING. 99 This second complaint not
only heralded ING Group’s withdrawal from the Orion project as a “critical victory of the
Equator Principles initiative,” but also went even further in asserting that “any support
86

Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.
Id. Principle 5 dictates that the borrower should consult “in a structured and culturally appropriate way
with project affected groups, including indigenous peoples and local NGOs.” The Equator Principles, supra
note 13, at 3.
88
Letter from A. Cohen Stuart, ING, to J.D. Taillant, CEDHA, ING’s involvement in Botnia’s pulp mill
project in Uruguay (Apr. 12, 2006), at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/ing-pulloutletter-april-12-2006.pdf.
89
Id.
90
Oliver Balch, Sustainable Banking: Uruguay Mills Act as Test Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 12, 2006.
91
Friends of the Earth is an environmental NGO founded in 1969 that forms an international network of
environmental organizations in seventy countries. Its mission is to protect the rights of all people to live in
a safe and healthy environment, both at home or in countries around the world. See Friends of the Earth
International, http://www.foei.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
92
Balch, supra note 90.
93
Id.
94
Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.
95
Id.
96
“With or without IFC support”, Botnia’s mill goes ahead, M ERCOPRESS, June 14, 2006,
http://www.mercopress.com/vernoticia.do?id=8137&formato=pdf.
97
Mekay, supra note 50; see also Bretton Woods Project, supra note 74.
98
Mekay, supra note 50.
99
Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 20.
87
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from Calyon to Botnia for this investment would imply Calyon’s knowing complicity in
the many violations cited and a violation of its commitments to uphold the Equa tor
Principles.”100 The violations cited in the complaint were identical to the ones mentioned
in the ING complaint letter. 101 The letter urged Calyon to “follow in the steps of its
Equator Bank colleague, ING Group, and cease any and all consideration of financing
Botnia.”102
¶27
Also unique to this second complaint was a section entitled “Growing International
Press Coverage to the Case,” in which CEDHA listed instances of intense media
coverage and growing media sympathy for the Argentine position as Botnia continued
construction of its plant and refused to cooperate in the international bilateral negotiations
processes. 103 The letter also provided further insight into why ING Group was explicit in
mentioning that the Equator Principles were not a critical consideration in their decision
to withdraw from the Orion project. The letter states that:
[w]hile ING Group will not and surely cannot publicly recognize that their
withdrawal is due to IFC policy violations of the Botnia project, or to the
Equator Principles Compliance Complaint, as this would surely result in
potential lawsuits against ING by Botnia, we are clear that the extensive
evidence provided by the CAO, as well as by independent reviews of the
EIAs, and by the Equator Principles Compliance Complaint shows beyond
a doubt that these projects are in direct violations of IFC policy, and as a
consequence, violate the Equator Principles. 104
¶28

Calyon responded to the CEDHA complaint by saying it would only withdraw if it
was determined that the Orion project did not comply with IFC Safeguards. 105 Calyon
was referring to the fact that the World Bank and the IFC itself, who also agree to only
finance projects that comply with IFC Safeguards, were also under investigation for
compliance based on their interest in financing the Orion project. 106 Because the extent
of Calyon’s voluntary commitment under the Principles was tied to whether or not the
project complied with IFC Safeguards, 107 if the investigation resulted in a finding that the
World Bank and the IFC could finance the Orion project, Calyon would thus feel free to
go forward in doing the same.

100

Id.
The violations were of international human rights and environmental law, violations of international
bilateral law, violations of IFC Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, violations of IFC Disclosure
Policy, violations of national and regional laws in Uruguay and Argentina, and finally, violations of the
Equator Principles. See id.
102
Id.
103
Id. Argentina and Uruguay had engaged in diplomatic efforts to reach an amicable solution to
Argentina’s unwillingness and Uruguay’s willingness to have the Orion paper pulp mill built.
104
Id.
105
M ERCOPRESS, supra note 96.
106
Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, Letter of complaint re: IFC Orion Project no. 23817 and Celulosas de
M’Bopicua, IFC Project no. 23681, available at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/;
see also CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 3.
107
The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2. Principle 3 states that “[f]or projects located in non-OECD
countries . . . the Assessment will refer to the then applicable IFC Performance Standards and the then
applicable Industry Specific EHS Guidelines.” Id.
101
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VI. THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN
¶29

As the conflict surrounding the financing and construction of the Orion project
developed, the World Bank and the IFC expressed an interest in investing in the Orion
project. 108 In an effort to cease the IFC’s consideration of funding the Orion project and
to force Calyon to back down, CEDHA needed a finding that the Orion project did not
comply with the IFC Safeguards. Such a finding would need to come from the CAO, an
independent office that reports directly to the President of the World Bank group
regarding IFC financing of projects. 109 A formal complaint to the CAO leads to an
internal audit evaluating whether the project complies with IFC Safeguards. 110 It does not
intervene in Board or Project processes but has the independence to make
recommendations that will be helpful in resolving disputes. 111 It is also committed to
addressing external complaints in a fair, objective and constructive manner while
fostering a higher level of accountability. 112 While reports and recommendations of the
CAO are public, it is the Office of the President of the World Bank Group that is
ultimately responsible for their implementation. 113
¶30
Even before it sent out the compliance complaint letters to ING and Calyon,
CEDHA filed a detailed complaint with the CAO in September 2005. 114 The complaint
was directed at the World Bank Board, the body that approves IFC financing of projects,
and was grounded, inter alia, on the violation of IFC policy that would result from
investment in the Orion project. Particularly, the complaint addressed non-compliance
with IFC Operational Policy OP7.50 on Projects on International Waterways 115 , IFC
Operational Policy OP 4.01 on Environme ntal Assessment 116 and the IFC Disclosure
108

CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 3.
Id.
110
CAO, Welcome to Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ (last visited
Apr. 17, 2008).
111
Press Release, CAO, CAO Urges Parties to Review Cumulative Impact Study on Uruguayan Pulp Mills:
CAO Internal Audit Continues (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.caoombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO%20Media%20Advisory%20English%20(12-20-05)1.pdf.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra note 106.
115
Id. at 19. OP7.50 dictates that there be goodwill between riparian states. The policy establishes the
obligation of the borrower to notify the other riparian states of the proposed project, to identify existing
agreements and their significance concerning the anticipated impacts of the project, and to create a Project
Appraisal Document dealing with the international aspects of the project. See The World Bank Operational
Manual, OP 7.50, available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf/whatnewvirt/5F511C57E7F3A3DD852
5672C007D07A2?OpenDocument. The main alleged violation under OP7.50 was the failure of the IFC to
identify riparian state agreements and their significance with respect to the anticipated environmental
impacts of the proposed project. See Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra note 106, at 19.
116
OP 4.01 requires that the IFC review the borrower’s Environmental Impact Assessment and, if adequate,
disclose them. The disclosure triggers a sixty-day window of public scrutiny. Only after the disclosure
period is concluded can the IFC submit the project to the World Bank Board for approval. OP 4.01 also
requires a meaningful and culturally appropriate consultation with the affected parties. See The World Bank
Operational Manual, supra note 115. CEDHA alleged the following violations of OP 4.01: (1) that the
Project did not properly consider its “area of influence,” therefore ignoring aspects of trans-boundary
environmental contamination on Argentine territory; (2) that the Project disregarded country obligations
under international law and the Rio Uruguay Treaty with Argentina; (3) that the Project did not
contemplate feasible alternatives and did not provide an environmental action plan; and (4) that the Project
did not sufficiently consult with the Argentine communities involved. See Letter from CEDHA to the CAO,
109
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Policy. 117 In addition, the CEDHA complaint also identified violations to the IFC
Disclosure Policy. CEDHA alleged that the project sponsor and the IFC failed to foster
real public consultation of stakeholders in Argentine territories; failed to ensure public
access to information about likely environmental, economic, and social impacts; and
failed to publish environmental and social information about the project’s impact on the
locality and on affected stakeholders in Argentina. 118
A. The CAO Preliminary Assessment Report
¶31

In response to the CEDHA complaint, the CAO released a Preliminary Assessment
Report in November 2005. 119 The CAO Report was the result of a five-day field
assessment in which the CAO reviewed relevant IFC documentation and visited the
communities in Gualeguaychu and Fray Bentos. 120 The CAO addressed two main
procedural deficiencies in the processes that resulted in the approval of the financing for
the Orion Project. First, the CAO determined that the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) for the pulp mill did not adequately address the concerns of potentially affected
local people. 121 In particular, the CAO found that the EIA did not provide sufficient
evidence that concerns related to potential impacts on tourism and agriculture had been
addressed. 122 For instance, the CAO found that there was little evidence presented in the
EIA that potentially- impacted enterprises or individuals (such as tourism operators and
fishermen), particularly from Argentina, were consulted. 123 The CAO pointed out that the
EIA also failed to consider broader cumulative impact beyond environmental emissions,
such as the social and environmental consequences to land- holding and social equity as a
result of both mills developing large eucalyptus plantations in Uruguay. 124
¶32
Second, the CAO determined that the IFC failed to conduct a Cumulative Impact
Study (CIS) and to require a comprehensive assessment of the impact of having two
paper pulp mills (Orion and the one ENCE sought to build) operating in close proximity
as part of its review. 125 The Preliminary Assessment outlines the IFC appraisal policy
that dictates a consultation period, including the creation of a CIS, the preparation of
EIAs, and other documentation containing relevant information to impacted people. 126
Following this consultation period is the 60-day disclosure period prior to consideration
by the World Bank Board which decides whether or not the IFC will finance a project. 127
The disclosure period allows for any formal objections to be made before the Board
decides whether or not to finance a project. 128 This means that the disclosure period and
the consultation period, where the CIS and other documentation are created, should be
supra note 106, at 17-18.
117
Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra note 106, at 17-18.
118
Id. at 20.
119
CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26.
120
Id. at 2.
121
Id. at 9.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 7.
126
Id. at 11.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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kept strictly separate. The CAO pointed out that while the IFC recognized the need to
undertake a CIS when it was resolving initial concerns brought up in the early phases of
consultation, the IFC did so only after the public disclosure of the project documentation
on the World Bank InfoShop. 129 The CAO further concluded that the consultation and
disclosure processes related to approvals for the Orion project “give[s] the impression of
being rushed, and presented as a fait accompli to those being consulted.”130
¶33
The CAO Preliminary Report included four recommendations to the IFC. First, the
CAO recommended that the consultation and disclosure periods be kept separate and not
confused. 131 As will be seen shortly, this was easily remediable. Second, the CAO
recommended a series of specific “process steps” to be taken in the creation of the CIS. 132
This provided the IFC with a compact guideline of how to satisfy the procedural
requirements for the creation of the CIS. The recommendation also included the factual
matters that should be addressed in the CIS, including, among others, the potential
impacts of water emissions on water quality, as well as local and tourist fishing
communities; potential impacts of air emissions on agricultural productivity; potential
impacts of eucalyptus plantations on landholder equity; and water availability. 133 Third,
the CAO asked the IFC to clarify the interpretation of OP 4.01 paragraph 3 which refers
to EIAs taking into account “the country’s overall policy framework and national
legislation . . . and obligations of the country pertaining to project activities, under
relevant international environmental treaties and agreements.”134 Fourth, the CAO asked
for greater clarity in the application of the social and environmental appraisal procedures
by the IFC.135 The Preliminary Report’s obvious focus was on the procedural aspects
surrounding the consideration of financing approval for the Orion project.
¶34
Once the World Bank released the CIS in December 2005, thereby correcting the
procedural errors highlighted in the November Preliminary Report, the CAO role in the
dispute effectively came to an end. On December 20, 2005, the CAO sent letters to all
parties involved urging them to review the CIS that the World Bank had just released. 136
The CAO informed the parties that the sixty-day consultative phase had been initiated
and that it would issue a final report of its audit in January. 137 The CAO made clear that
the purpose of the Final Report was to “identify lessons learned and corrective actions for
the institution but [would] not be a factor in any decision whether or not the bank invests
in either of the two pulp mills.”138 Practically, the CEDHA complaint to the CAO
129

Id. at 9. The World Bank Infoshop is a development bookstore and an information and resource center
which provides access to information and services to the public. It is located in Washington, DC and is part
of the network of the Public Information Centers (PICs) around the world. Through it, any person can
access World Bank reports and data, request customized presentations about the Bank’s disclosure policy,
among others. See The World Bank, About InfoShop,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PUBLICATION/INFOSHOP1/0,,contentMDK:20121778
~hlPK:348863~menuPK:323749~pagePK:162350~piPK:165575~theSitePK:225714,00.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2008).
130
CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 10.
131
Id. at 11.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Press Release, CAO, supra note 110.
137
Id.
138
Id.
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resulted in an opportunity for the IFC to correct the procedural errors in its compliance
with its own Disclosure Policy. Moreover, as for IFC OP 4.01 on Environmental
Assessment, the IFC would merely have to clarify the manner in which it applied social
and environmental appraisal procedures.
¶35
As outlined in the Final Report released on February 22, 2006, the scope of the
CAO audit was thus limited to providing greater clarity in relation to the application of
social and environmental appraisal procedures by the IFC.139 The three main goals of the
audit were: (1) to review IFC’s due diligence of the Orion project to satisfy itself that the
EIAs were complete in all material respects prior to disclosure; (2) to review if the actual
practice of requiring additional information after public disclosure of the EIA is
consistent with applicable policies; and (3) to understand how the application and
interpretation of IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures can result in such
differing outcomes between the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency140 (“MIGA”). 141 In short, this gave the IFC an opportunity to correct procedural
deficiencies but it did not help CEDHA achieve its goal of stopping the construction of
the paper pulp mill in Uruguay.
¶36
Indeed, on October 12, 2006, the IFC released reports concluding that the Orion
project would not harm the environment in the border region. 142 These reports supported
the building of both paper pulp mills and were a definitive blow to CEDHA’s efforts to
interrupt the financing for the construction of the mills. 143 Environmental activists from
Gualeguaychu and Colon, two Argentine cities, reacted with outrage, protests and
blockaded roads. 144 On November 21, 2006, the board of directors of the IFC and MIGA
approved a $170 million investment by the IFC and a guarantee of up to $350 million
from MIGA for the Orion project. 145 The IFC claimed that this decision came after an
extensive due diligence process which reached the conclusion that the mill would
generate significant economic benefits for Uruguay and cause no environmental harm. 146
Once the IFC concluded that the project conformed to its own environmental and social
policies, Calyon, the EPFI involved in the project at the time, was assured that it was
providing financing for a project that fell within the good graces of the Equator
Principles.
¶37
CEDHA thus failed to stop the construction of the pulp mill through the CAO.
While the function of the CAO is to determine whether or not the project complies with
IFC Safeguards, its reach in this case was merely procedural. The Final Report focused
on the procedural timeline of the consultation, disclosure and consideration periods.
Furthermore, the CAO limited its own scope to providing greater clarity in relation to the
139

CAO, FINAL REPORT , supra note 63.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency is a member of the World Bank which promotes foreign
direct investment in developing countries. It provides three services: political risk insurance, technical
assistance to improve investment climates and promote investment opportunities in developing countries,
and dispute mediation services. See MIGA, About MIGA,
http://www.miga.org/quickref/index_sv.cfm?stid=1588 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
141
Id.
142
Uruguay/Argentina politics: Pulp plant dispute reignites, EIU VIEWSW IRE Argentina, Oct. 17, 2006.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
IFC, IFC Latin American & the Caribbean – Orion Pulp Mill - Uruguay,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/lac.nsf/Content/Uruguay_Pulp_Mills (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
146
Id.
140
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application of social and environmental appraisal procedures by the IFC. Although
Calyon’s voluntary commitment to finance only projects that abide by the IFC
Safeguards provided CEDHA with the opportunity to allege in a formal adjudicatory
venue that the Orion project did not abide by IFC Safeguards, in the end, the CAO
unfortunately only focused on procedural compliance with the IFC Safeguards.
VII. EVOLVING PRINCIPLES
¶38

In July 2006, the Equator Principles were revised so that the World Bank Group
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines (“EHS”) replaced the IFC Safeguards as
the standard by which projects must abide. 147 The new Guidelines contain performance
levels and measures that are normally acceptable to the IFC and are generally considered
to be achievable in new facilities at reasonable costs while retaining existing
technology. 148 A new feature contained in the EHS is that the environmental assessment
may recommend alternative levels or measures which, if acceptable to the IFC, become
project or site-specific requirements. 149 The new standards would require clients to pay
closer attention to social impacts, to consult affected communities more effectively, and
to recognize the special rights of indigenous peoples in international law. 150 The new
standards will probably result in a heightened assessment by the CAO of procedural
compliance with the EHS. However, it remains to be seen if these new standards are
sufficiently rigorous to protect communities from the construction of projects that will
likely cause social and environmental harm.
A. Developing the Equator Principles

¶39

In spite of these new standards and the lowering of the $50 million threshold to $10
million, there remains a lot to be done for the Equator Principles. The failure of CEDHA
to hold Calyon accountable stemmed in large part from the voluntary, non-binding nature
of the Principles themselves and also from the limited, mainly procedural, reach of the
CAO in reviewing project compliance with IFC Safeguards. If the Principles are to result
in more responsible lending practices, EPFIs should consider higher standards of review,
perhaps going above and beyond the IFC Safeguards, and an internal mechanism to
ensure EPFI compliance. A higher standard of review would require EPFIs and
corporations to pay even closer attention to the environmental and social impacts of
future projects. As higher standards become more acceptable in the finance world, one
may hope that in the near future controversial projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline 151 and the Sakhalin II oil project 152 will not be built without significant
safeguards for impacted peoples and regions.
147

The Equator Principles, supra note 13; see also The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions,
FAQ n. 4, supra note 32.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
THE BANKER, supra note 37.
151
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Like the Orion
project, the pipeline was built among heated controversy and claims of environmental and human rights
violations; the main environmental concern was the destruction of viable fishing in the port of Ceyhan in
Turkey. See Baku-Ceyhan Campaign,Environmental risks in the BTC pipeline,
http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/more_info/impacts.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). Nine EPFIs financed
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¶40

In assessing what improvements could be made to the Equator Principles, the 2005
Freshfields survey is instructive. While the survey pre-dated the revised 2006 Principles,
many of its recommendations remain pertinent to the future of the Equator Principles. 153
The survey stressed the need for EPFIs to continue their efforts to work together and to
maintain their open-door policy154 in spite of the danger of attracting signatories that are
not truly committed to the Principles. 155 The survey also called for greater transparency,
both in terms of disclosure of certain details of projects considered and accepted, and for
greater communication with NGOs and other stakeholders in the course of each EPFI
implementation of the Principles. 156 The survey also pointed to EPFI dissatisfaction with
the IFC consultation process and suggested a further round of consultation to be added to
the process. 157 EPFIs would then conduct their own screening process so as to satisfy
themselves as to the adequacy of all material social and environmental reports produced
or commissioned by the borrower. 158 Since the Principles were first created, EPFIs have
not shied away from tailoring the Principles to inch closer to their ultimate goal. 159 Since
the survey appears to allude to a general sense that the Principles should continue to
extend its influence, it would not be surprising if the EPFIs engaged in another
reassessment of the reach and scope of the Principles. 160
¶41
There also remains considerable debate focusing on whether voluntary or
regulatory initiatives are the best method to affect corporate social behavior. 161 Certainly,
the voluntary nature of the Principles contributed to its quick membership expansion and
popularity. 162 Voluntary principles can also be instrumental in changing corporate social
behavior by providing a system of norms where legislation is absent and supplementing
legislation where it is in place. 163 Voluntariness, however, only goes so far, and firmer
steps need to be taken so that the goals of the Principles can be fulfilled. Calls have also
been made for the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that deals with
alleged violations of the Principles, a development that would impose liability on EPFIs
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline under the first set of Principles. See THE BANKER, supra note 42.
152
The Sakhalin II oil project, currently under construction in Russia, poses a direct threat to the last
remaining western Pacific grey whales. See THE BANKER, supra note 42.
153
Watchman, supra note 16, at 390-391.
154
All financial institutions are invited to become EPFIs. See The Equator Principles, Become an Adopting
Institution, http://www.equator-principles.com/join.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Watchman, supra note 16, at 395. The added consultation round would come after the IFC consultation
process and give another opportunity for review of the impacts of proposed projects so that the EPFI could
be assured that the project reflects the ideals of sustainable and responsible development.
158
Id. at 392.
159
Between March and May of 2006, the EPFIs engaged in a substantive revision of the Principles which
led to the revised July 2006 Principles. See Press Release, The Equator Principles, Update: EPFI Review of
Equator Principles (June 8, 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2008). In May 2007, EPFIs met again to discuss more specific aspects of the Principles. Press Release, The
Equator Principles, EPFIs Meet After Nearly One Year of EPII Implementation (May 12-14, 2007),
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). In December 2007, EPFIs met
again to discuss ongoing developments of the Principles, in particular governance, transparency, and
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and fundamentally change the non-binding nature of the Principles. 164 One should expect
that such a critical change would not occur without protest from EPFIs and possible
withdrawal from unwilling EPFIs from the Principles altogether.
¶42
Nevertheless, if EPFIs are truly committed to sustainable development and
responsible lending practices, they must take steps to keep the Equator Principles current,
effective and relevant. Such efforts would result in the continued development of the
Principles and would be instrumental in continuing to set standards for the finance
industry.
VIII.

BEYOND THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

¶43

While the Equator Principles continue to evolve and the area of voluntary
principles and guidelines seeks firmer ground within the area of corporate human rights
responsibility, individuals, NGOs and states should go beyond the Principles and
continue to rely on the more traditional modes of enforcing treaties, agreements,
international human rights and environmental laws. Such modes of enforcement also
played a part in trying to stop the construction of the paper pulp mill in Uruguay. For
instance, CEDHA filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (“Commission”) against the World Bank in September 2005. 165 The complaint
denounced the World Bank’s proposed financing of the Orion project and directly
implicated a World Bank- financed development project for the first time. 166 It was an
unprecedented reach to a human rights tribunal to force non-state actor compliance. 167 To
this date, however, the Commission has not reached a decision on the complaint. If this
attempt at expanding the court’s jurisdiction is successful, it will pave the way for future
accountability of non-state actors.
¶44
Also, in May 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings against Uruguay in the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for violating the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay
which determined rights to the use of natural resources along the River Uruguay. 168 In
July 2006, the ICJ denied, without prejudice on the merits, the Argentine request of an
injunctive order to Uruguay to suspend construction. 169 The court found that Argentina
failed to meet the burden of imminent threat of irreparable damage and denied the
demand for an injunction. 170 The ICJ decision on whether Uruguay is violating the
Treaty is not expected until later in 2008, 171 well after the plant begins its operations.
Arguably, the ICJ mechanism could be more effective than any NGO campaign to force
non-state actors to comply with voluntary commitments, or any recourse to a formal
164
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adjudicatory venue such as the CAO. ICJ jurisdiction for contentious issues, however,
exists only for state members of the United Nations 172 on the basis of state consent over
“matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force.”173 This necessarily excludes individuals and NGOs from reaching
the ICJ unless a member state espouses a claim on their behalf. Furthermore, while an
ICJ decision finding a violation of the Treaty could result in anything from a formal
reprimand to fines and sanctions, or even the dismantling of the mill, in many instances,
such reparation would come only after considerable delay and damage to the environment
and surrounding areas has already been done.
IX. CONCLUSION
¶45

CEDHA was unable to stop the construction of a foreign-owned paper pulp mill to
prevent environmental and social damage to the communities of fishermen and tourist
industry of the Entre Ríos area. Unfortunately, the Equator Principles did not have
enough bite to compel Calyon’s compliance with its voluntary commitment. However,
for the project finance world, CEDHA’s efforts did not go unnoticed. CEDHA’s efforts
were instrumental in guaranteeing procedural compliance with IFC Safeguards, in
demanding clarification of IFC Operational Policies regarding Environmental
Assessment, in showing the world that EPFIs need to consolidate their approach to the
Principles, and in revealing that one can rely on the Principles to expose EPFIs to public
shaming in an effort to compel compliance with their commitment. CEDHA’s efforts
demonstrated that an NGO should not shy away from trying to hold a non-state actor
accountable to voluntary, non-binding commitments. ING’s withdrawal from the Orion
project suggests that some EPFIs do care about public opinion and will take such nonbinding commitments seriously. Voluntary commitments can be instrumental for NGOs
as leverage to reach desired goals and to prompt change, without having to resort to state
intervention, international human rights courts and other more formal, costly and timeconsuming adjudicatory venues.

172
173

U.N. CHARTER art. 93, ¶ 1.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 1.

373

